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Card’s (1990) well-known analysis of the Mariel boatlift concluded that this mass influx of 
mostly less-skilled Cubans to Miami had little impact on the labor market outcomes of the 
city’s less-skilled workers.  This paper evaluates two explanations for this.  First, consistent 
with an open economy framework, this paper asks whether after the boatlift Miami increased 
its production of unskilled-intensive manufactured goods, allowing it to “export” the impact 
of the boatlift.  Second,  this paper asks whether  Miami adapted to the boatlift  by 
implementing new skill-complementary technologies more slowly than they otherwise would 
have.  Using a confidential micro data version of the Annual Surveys of Manufactures, I 
show  that  following the boatlift,  Miami’s relative output of different manufacturing 
industries trended similarly to other cities with similar pre-boatlift trends in manufacturing 
mix.  The response of industry mix to the boatlift therefore appears to be small.  Supporting 
the second type of adjustment,  utilization of Cuban labor  by Miami’s industries  rose 
proportionately to the supply increase generated by the boatlift.  In addition, post-boatlift 
computer use at work was lower in Miami than other cities with similar levels of computer-
based employment before the event, even among non-Hispanic workers in the same detailed 
cells defined by industry, occupation and education.  This suggests the boatlift induced 
Miami’s industries to employ more unskilled-intensive production technologies.  The results 
suggest an explanation for why native wages are consistently found to be insensitive to local 
immigration shocks: markets adapt production technology to local factor supplies. 
 
JEL:  J2, F1, O3. 
Keywords:   Immigration, Heckscher-Ohlin, technical change 
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1. Introduction and Background 
This paper asks how Miami’s labor market adjusted when a large number of Cuban refugees, 
most of them less skilled, settled permanently in Miami following the 1980 Mariel boatlift.
1  
Despite the size and unexpected nature of the event, it had surprisingly little impact on the 
wages and employment rates of Miami’s less-skilled workers, as Card’s (1990) widely-cited 
paper demonstrated.
2  Motivated by this evidence, t his paper  first investigates whether 
Miami responded to the boatlift like a Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) open economy.  HO suggests 
the boatlift may have had little impact on the relative price of unskilled labor in Miami 
because  Miami  effectively “ exported” the  Cuban refugees’ labor embodied in unskilled-
intensive goods.
3  Besides the fact that the Miami economy is a small part of an apparently 
well-integrated US economy  (e.g. Hanson and Slaughter (2002)),  HO is  a  compelling 
explanation for Miami’s experience because at the time of the boatlift, Miami had a large 
unskilled manufacturing sector (e.g. apparel) accustomed to absorbing Cuban refugees.  This 
paper evaluates the importance of open-economy adjustments by measuring the extent to 
which Miami’s manufacturing mix shifted toward unskilled-intensive industries following the 
boatlift.  This evaluation serves as a test of HO more generally: as a substantial and one-time 
shock to Miami’s endowment of less-skilled labor, the boatlift can provide unique “quasi-
experimental” evidence about the extent to which factor endowments influence industry mix 
in a way consistent with the HO model. 
                                                 
1 Card (1990) reports the boatlift increased the size of the Miami labor force by around 7 percent.  The event 
took place between May and September 1980. 
2 Miami’s experience after the boatlift is also consistent with a large body of research that finds immigration has 
little local impact on native labor market outcomes (Borjas (1994), Friedberg and Hunt (1995)). 
3 Another possibility is that unskilled native workers left Miami in response to the boatlift.  However, Saiz 
(2003) has shown that if anything it was skilled natives who left in response to the boatlift – because of a 
negative consumption amenity (as revealed by a permanent fall in house prices) – which would only tend to 
reinforce the impact of the boatlift.       3 
 
This paper also considers a second explanation for Miami’s experience: the boatlift induced 
Miami producers to adopt new skill-complementary technologies more slowly.  The early 
1980s was a period  when the gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers 
widened while the relative supply of skilled workers rose.  Some research has attributed to 
the spread of technologies, such as computers, that raise the relative productivity of skilled 
workers and replace unskilled workers (Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998)).  Though skill-
biased technological change (SBTC) is often taken as exogenous, some models suggest the 
presence of a large skilled work force may induce modes of production to become more skill-
intensive.  In models by Acemoglu (2002, 1998), the size of the potential market for an 
innovation affects the incentive to invest in R&D, and thus a large supply of skilled labor 
induces skill-augmenting innovations.
4  More relevant to the present paper is the research of 
Beaudry and Green (2000, 2003).  They show that when firms can chose between high skill-
share (“new”) and low skill-share (“traditional”) modes of production, the relative supply of 
skilled labor affects the combination of technologies firms will optimally choose: areas with 
more skilled labor will use more of the  high  skill-share methods.   I n addition, when 
technology can be chosen endogenously, it is not necessarily the case that an increase in the 
relative supply of a factor lowers its relative wage.
5 
 
Miami may have adjusted to the boatlift by adopting new skill-complementary technologies 
more slowly than they otherwise would have.  If this were a large part of the adjustment, 
                                                 
4 In Acemoglu’s model, agents have monopoly rights over their innovations, and thus can charge a markup on 
each unit sold.  For this reason, the size of the market is important. 
5 In fact, Beaudry and Green (2000) give conditions for the “perverse” result where relative wages rise with 
relative supply.       4 
little shift in industry mix would be required to absorb the Mariel immigrants and maintain 
unskilled relative wages.  Instead, one would observe higher rates of utilization of unskilled 
labor and slower adoption of these technologies. 
 
Besides Beaudry and Green’s work, other evidence on US labor markets during the 1980s 
suggests that technology shifts in response to local factor supply shocks.  Saad-Lessler (2003) 
showed that in large US states during the 1980s movements in factor-output ratios within 
industry were related to changes in the state’s factor supplies. Lewis (2003) showed that 
changes in worker mix in US metropolitan areas during the 1980s were largely absorbed by 
within-industry  changes in skill intensity, without much change in relative wages.  In 
addition, computer use increased more rapidly (among similar workers) in markets where the 
relative supply of college-educated grew more rapidly.  Thus localities may adapt production 
technology to their factor mix. 
 
To evaluate the role of open-economy adjustments to the Mariel boatlift, I use a confidential 
micro data version of the Annual Surveys of Manufacturers, and look for evidence of a trend 
break in manufacturing mix following the boatlift.  Manufacturing is chosen because it is a 
major traded sector, particularly for unskilled employment.  Initially comparing Miami to a 
set of 11 mostly midwestern and southern metropolitan areas with similar trends to Miami in 
manufacturing mix during the 1970s, I find little evidence of an accommodating change in 
industry mix after the boatlift.  To be sure that this not an artifact of the particular choice of 
comparison group, I show that among 108 large metropolitan areas, the more closely a 
metropolitan area matched Miami’s trends in manufacturing mix during the 1970s, the more       5 
similar were its trends to Miami after the boatlift.  Overall, there is little evidence the boatlift 
caused trend breaks in the  output of any of Miami’s manufacturing industries.    One 
exception to this is that it appears skilled manufacturing sectors declined steadily in Miami 
after the boatlift, a trend which may be related to the apparent flight of skilled workers from 
Miami beginning sometime after the boatlift (Saiz (2003)). 
  
This paper does not examine trends in non-manufacturing sectors.
6   However, Card’s earlier 
version of the boatlift paper (Card (1989)) found the broad mix of industries in Miami was 
similar in 1978-79 and 1983-84; in any case, there is little unskilled employment in traded 
industries outside manufacturing.  In addition, the Cuban share of employment rose across a 
wide array of Miami’s industries after the boatlift, suggesting the Mariel immigrants were 
absorbed  within industry.  To provide more direct evidence that  this  might have been 
accommodated by a shift away  from (compared to other markets) unskilled-replacing 
technology, the paper compares the amount of computer use at work in Miami to other 
cities.  Four years after the boatlift, workers in Miami were less likely to use computers at 
work than workers in the comparison cities used in this study, as well as in the comparison 
cities used in Card (1990).  This computer-use  gap diminishes substantially but does not 
disappear when limiting the comparison to non-Hispanic workers in the same detailed cells 
defined by age, education, occupation and industry. 
 
                                                 
6 In a future version of this paper, I may use County Business Patterns data to look for evidence of industry 
mix changes outside manufacturing.  An electronic version of these data going back to the early 1970s has 
recently become available to me.       6 
Taken as a whole, the findings of this paper suggest that the Miami labor market did not 
adjust to the boatlift in a manner consistent with HO.  The boatlift may have induced a shift 
away from skill-biased technologies, something not predicted by the simple HO model. 
 
2. Data 
The Annual Surveys of Manufacturers (ASM) data used in this project were made available 
in the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), a confidential dataset that 
links establishment-level survey data from Censuses of Manufactures (CM), occurring once 
every five years, in years ending in “2” and “7,” and the Annual Survey of Manufactures 
(ASM), occurring every year.
7  This project uses the ASM data.  For the purpose of the 




The ASM, whose survey design goal is to produce reliable aggregate statistics on shipments 
by industry, collects detailed shipment, cost and asset information from a sample of 
manufacturing establishments each year.  Beginning two years after a CM, firms are selected 
to be in the ASM using the previous CM as the sampling frame.  Large establishments, and 
ones that produce a large share of any industry’s output, are always included in the ASM.   
Very small establishments are excluded from the survey.  Among  medium-sized 
establishments, a r andom sample is drawn, stratified on firm size.  Once selected, an 
                                                 
7 The description of the LRD and the ASM in this section is based upon LRD documentation (US Department 
of Commerce (1999)), appendices to the Census Bureau’s industry series reports (for example, US Department 
of Commerce (2002)), and ASM and CM survey forms, available on the Census Bureau’s website.  
8 It sometimes happens that a single large establishment produces distinct product lines; when the amounts are 
significant, the Census Bureau attempts to treat each product line within the same physical location as a 
separate establishment.       7 
establishment is surveyed every year (unless it shuts down) for the subsequent five years.  To 
maintain the representativeness of the sample, newly active firms may be added during the 
five-year period using updated records on the universe of manufacturing establishments.
9  
However,  Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1991) have shown that  the Bureau  is not 
successful at maintaining the ASMs representativeness within a panel, and that as a result the 
ASM does not reliably measure one-year changes in manufacturing employment.  They do 
provide evidence, through comparisons to other data, that long-run growth rates are reliably 
measured in the ASM. 
 
Another weakness of the ASM is that very small firms are not observed, and since the 
present project is concerned with measuring aggregate growth in each industry, it would be a 
problem  if  much of the activity were to occur in  small manufacturing firms.  ASM 
documentation reports that the data are representative of the vast majority of production. 
 
This also makes use of employment and labor force data from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses 
of Population 5 percent micro samples (PUMS) and annual county population estimates 
from the County Age, Sex, Race files (US Department of Commerce (1985, 1993, 1998)).  
Importantly, the 1980 Census was taken before the boatlift occurred.
10  All of the data were 
                                                 
9 Lists of enterprises come from IRS and Social Security Administration records. In addition, the Census 
Bureau surveys manufacturing enterprises to obtain lists of new establishments opened by multi-unit 
enterprises. 
10 The census purports to be a snapshot of the US population as of April 1st of the census year.  The boatlift 
began after this date in 1980.       8 
aggregated to the metropolitan area level in a way that matched the 1990 Census definitions 
of the metropolitan area boundaries as closely as possible.
11 
 
3. Industry Mix 
The section looks for evidence of unskilled-accommodating changes in manufacturing mix 
in Miami following the boatlift.  In order to account for changes to Miami’s manufacturing 
mix that might have occurred in the absence of the boatlift, I initially compare Miami to 
eleven metropolitan areas (aggregated), chosen because they had similar trends in output to 
Miami in four broad skill-rated manufacturing aggregates during the 1970s.
12  Later I will 
perform a more general comparison that involves a larger number of cities.  The three-digit 
industries in these aggregates are listed in the appendix table and are described further below.  
In short, though, the major trend that needed to be matched on was the rapid contraction of 
Miami’s apparel sector during the 1970s, which also occurred in these comparison cities. 
 
Before examining changes in manufacturing mix in these cities, it is useful to see how 
Maimi’s labor market changed after the boatlift relative to this set of comparison cities 
(which are different than those used in Card (1990)).  Table 1 presents changes in the labor 
force attributes of Miami and the comparison cities between 1980 and 1990.  Miami’s Cuban 
labor force grew by 13 percent during the decade, similar to estimates of the boatlift’s impact 
presented in Card (1989).  High school dropouts increased their presence in Miami’s labor 
force by 8 percent and decreased their presence in the comparison cities’ labor force by 25 
                                                 
11 Deaton and Lubotsky’s (2003) tabulations (with a couple minor corrections) are used to construct 
metropolitan areas in the 1980 and 1990 PUMS. 
12 The eleven metro areas are Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland, OH; Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN; Rochester, NY; 
Pittsburgh, PA; Nashville, TN; Greensboro-Winston-Salem, NC; Richmond-Petersburg, VA; Nassau-Suffolk, 
NY; Riverside-San Bernardino, CA; Chicago, IL       9 
percent.  The latter number is typical of the national as a whole – the 1980s was a period of 
rapid educational attainment.  Because of the boatlift, Miami experienced smaller growth in 
the supply of skills.  Table 1 also shows that more educated workers decreased their presence 
in Miami’s work force in comparison to these other cities. 
 
Table 1 provides some suggestive evidence confirming that the boatlift had little impact on 
Miami’s labor force, at least after 10 years, compared to these cities.  Statistically significant 
changes include the 6 percent decline in the employment rates of blacks and non-Cuban 
Hispanics relative to the comparison cities, but it is worth noting that the fall in employment 
rates is less than this for the subgroup most likely to be most competitive with the Mariel 
immigrants, high school dropouts.  Changes to the structure of wages in Miami and these 
other cities are also statistically similar.  The apparent 20 percent decline in wages for non-
Cuban Hispanics is either spurious – it is not statistically significant – or not causally related 
to the Mariel boatlift, as it concentrated among more educated Hispanics.  Thus the boatlift 
appears in these data to have had little lasting impact on the labor market outcomes of less-
skilled workers in Miami. 
 
Defining Industry Categories 
The ASM is a very industrially disaggregated dataset, reporting industry at the four-digit 
level.  But given the size of the sample, it is infeasible to fully exploit this level of detail.  
Instead, four aggregates will be examined.  First, apparel will be examined separately as it is 
Miami’s single largest manufacturing industry, and as it is a major low-skill employer that 
tends to expand with the availability of less-skilled labor (Lewis (2003)).  Industries other       10
than apparel are classified into three categories based upon their output responsiveness to 
the local availability of high school dropouts in US metropolitan areas during the 1980s, 
which serves to reflect the likely impact of Mariel immigrants on the Miami labor market.
13  
“Group 1” industries responded most positively to dropouts, group 2 industries had little 
response to dropouts, and group 3 industries generally responded negatively to dropouts.  
The industries in each of these categories are listed in the appendix.  The three groups plus 
apparel partition manufacturing. 
 
These industry groups were designed to be approximately equal in size in terms of the shares 
of the Mariel immigrants that were likely to be employed by them, ascertained using the 
employment shares of the Cuban migrants who arrived just before the Mariel boatlift (1975-
80) in 1980.  Table 2 shows that these pre-Mariel Cubans in 1980 had for the most part 
similar education levels to “Mariel” immigrants (Cubans who arrived 1980-81, and age 26-64 
in 1990) observed in 1990, although more pre-Mariel Cubans completed high school.  The 
share of employment in each industry group is shown in the lower panel.  In total, 
approximately 30 percent of pre-Mariel Cubans worked in manufacturing.   Fewer of the 
                                                 
13 More specifically, industries j were ranked on the coefficient  
j g  from the regressions: 
 
jc c j c dropouts j j jc P h L g f Q w + D + D + = D % % % ,  
 
where 
jc Q D % represents output growth between 1980 and 1990 in industry j and city c, 
c dropouts L , %D  represents 
high school dropout labor force growth in city c, and 
c P D % represents population growth in c.  Output was 
measured in the ASM, and labor force and population were measured in the Census of Population.  After 
ranking industries on this dropout-responsiveness measure, they were then grouped into approximately equal-
sized sectors based on the employment shares of pre-Mariel (1975-80 arrival cohort) Cubans in 1980.  Each 
regression uses the subset of Lewis’s (2003) sample of 179 cities for which there was a plant with nonzero 
output in 1980.  Apparel, not included in the three groups, is second to only to yarn and fabric mills on this 
dropout-responsiveness measure.       11




Figure 1 plots apparel value added per capita, normalized to its pre-1980 level, annually 
between 1972 and 1996 for Miami and the region of comparison cities.
14  Superimposed on 
the figure are fitted linear trends for each region.  They show  a steep decline in apparel 
output in the 1970s in Miami.
15  By design there is also a steep decline in the 1970s in the 
comparison cities, which were chosen to match on this trend and on the 1970s trend in the 
other three aggregates (shown below).
16 
 
We are looking for evidence of a post-1980 trend change in Miami relative to the 
comparison cities, and the figure shows that the contraction in the 1970s abated around 
1980 in the comparison region and in the early 1980s in Miami.  Note that the jump in 
Miami’s output in 1984 also coincides with an updating of the ASM panel that year – the 
true series doesn’t necessarily change so sharply there.
17  (See discussion in data section.)  In 
any case, the average recovery seems to have been larger in Miami, as indicated by the linear 
trends, but note also that it seems to fade over time. 
                                                 
14 Output or value added in the ASM is measured as the total value of shipments minus materials and energy 
costs (with adjustments for inventory changes).   This definition avoids the double counting of intermediate 
goods produced in the manufacturing sector.  The source for annual population estimates is described in the 
data section. 
15 These trends were computed without the 1980 data point. 
16 The simple average of the four trend differences from Miami during the 1970s was the matching criteria.  
Each aggregate was weighted equally because each was an approximately equal employer of pre-Mariel Cubans. 
(See Table 2.)  108 cities were available to be matched (the sample is described below), and these 11 were the 
top 10 percent of the matches. 
17 County business patterns data show no large jump in apparel employment in Miami in 1984 or in any prior 
year after the boatlift.       12
 
Other industry groups (shown in Figures 2 – 4) also suggest a small apparent impact of the 
boatlift, apart from the third industry group – comprised of industries that tend to respond 
negatively to the availability of dropouts – which appears to go into steady decline a few 
years after the boatlift.  This may be related to the flight of homeowners, who are more likely 
to be skilled workers, from the Miami labor market following the boatlift (Saiz (2003)). 
 
Table 3 summarizes all of the estimated linear trends.  The even columns in this table show 
the trend break models plotted in the figures.  The odd columns allow also for an intercept 
shift at 1980.  Such an intercept shift would uncover any immediate impact of the boatlift.  
Although the estimated overall post-1980 coefficient is significantly negative in the first and 
second industry groups, the interaction with Miami provides no evidence of a relative shift in 
Miami.  In addition, including the “post” dummy does not affect the estimates of primary 
interest, namely the post-boatlift relative trend breaks in Miami, which are shown in the last 
row of the table.  Only the estimate for the second industry group is statistically different 
than zero, though consistent with the figures, the point estimate is positive for apparel, and 




The estimates in Table 3 are on average positive (recall that each sector is an approximately 
equal-sized employer of pre-Mariel Cubans) which might suggest some modest 
accommodation of the Mariel immigration event through the mix of manufacturing 
                                                 
18 OLS standard errors are likely to be understated because they do not take account of the high level of serial 
correlation in the data.  See Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2003).       13
industries.  However, another pattern emerges in Table  3: trend differences before the 
boatlift (line 4) are similar in magnitude to the estimated trend breaks.  For example, Figure 
3 reveals that the positive estimate for group 2 is driven by the relative decline in Miami before 
1980; after 1980 the trends are nearly parallel in Miami and the comparison cities.  This is 
problematic, as it is not necessarily the case that prior trend differences would have 
continued after 1980 in the absence of the boatlift.  In general, one could ask the question 
whether smaller trend break estimates are obtained by using comparison regions that more 
exactly match Miami’s trends before the boatlift. 
 
This turns out to be the case.  Figure 5 uses each  of 108 large immigrant-receiving 
metropolitan areas as separate control regions.  It plots, for the apparel sector, the estimated 
trend break against the estimated trend differences before 1980.
19   In other words, each of 
the points in this graph represents a metropolitan area other than Miami; the x-axis measures 
Miami’s pre-1980 difference in trend from this metropolitan area, and the y-axis measures 
the estimated relative trend break after 1980.  What is shown is that there is a systematic 
negative linear relationship between the two: the larger the relative decline in Miami’s apparel 
sector, the larger the estimated “recovery” we obtain.  In fact, the tradeoff is about 1 for 1: 
the estimated line through these points (which weights each city by its 1980 population) has 
a slope statistically indistinguishable from minus 1.  In addition, cities that experienced 
                                                 
19I estimate trend-break models without intercept shift (like the odd columns of Table  3).  The 108 
metropolitan areas are each: (1) Among the top 100 receivers of (working-age) immigrants during the 1980s, or 
having at least 1 percent of 1990 population foreign-born arrivals from the 1980s and (2) had at least one plant 
in each of the four industry groups in the ASM sample in each of the years 1972-1996.  The 179 metropolitan 
areas used in the construction of the industry groups meet criteria (1).  (2) is essentially a restriction on size.       14
similar declines to Miami saw similar recoveries in the 1980s: the intercept is near 0.  What 
this says is that estimates different than 0 are driven primarily by prior difference in trend.
20 
 
Figures 6 shows the same kind of comparisons for each of the other three industry groups, 
and again cities that are matched to Miami in prior trends show similar trends after the 
boatlift.  The results are summarized in Table 4, which shows the slope of an estimated line 
through the points for each industry group.  Only t he third  (“skilled”) industry group 
provides some evidence of an impact: the intercept is statistically significant and negative, 
though small, which might be related to the loss of skilled  labor as mentioned above.  
Another feature of these data evident in the figures, however, is that a lot the potential 
comparison cities are clustered around 0 anyway – that is, it is hard to find evidence of any 
impact no matter which city you compare to Miami. 
 
While one cannot rule out that some of the cities that differ from Miami in pre-1980 trends 
are a good comparison group, that all of the large estimates come from cities that differed 
substantially from Miami before the boatlift does not provide much support for the 
contention that the Mariel boatlift had an impact on Miami’s manufacturing mix. 
 
Another robustness issue is whether these results are particular to the output data.  In this 
regard, it is possible to replicate all of the empirical methods used so far using employment 
                                                 
20 If observed prior differences in trend from Miami were driven mainly by classical measurement error, this 
would tend to produce a slope estimate of -1, though not necessarily an intercept of 0, in this relationship.       15
data.
21   Using employment data also does not produce evidence that the Mariel immigrants 
were accommodated by a change in Miami’s manufacturing mix. 
 
Taken together, the results suggest it is unlikely that the Mariel boatlift affected the industry 
mix of Miami’s manufacturing sector – the observed changes are likely to have occurred 
even in the absence of the boatlift. 
 
4. Changes in Labor and Computer Use 
What Happened to the Mariel Immigrants? 
It might be fruitful to examine non-manufacturing sectors for their role in adjusting to the 
Mariel boatlift.  On the other hand, there are few traded sectors outside of manufacturing 
that are major employers of l ess-educated workers in Miami.  Instead I will ask the 
alternative question: In which industries did Mariel immigrants actually find employment 
after the boatlift?  As in Table 2, here I use the 1990 Census as my post-boatlift observation, 
and define “Mariel” immigrants as those Cuban immigrants who report having arrived in the 
US in 1980 or 1981.
22,23  Comparing them to the employment patterns of Cuban immigrants 
who arrived just before them (1975-80), I find that the boatlift increased the presence of 
Cuban workers in most of Miami’s industries.
24 
 
                                                 
21 It is also possible to use capital stock to measure industry mix, though the series is noisier and only available 
in census years after 1985.  The trends in the capital series behave similarly to the output data. 
22 This should be a good approximate identifier of the Mariel immigrants.  INS statistics on immigrants 
admitted as permanent residents to the US report only 10,858 Cuban arrivals in 1981 (US Department of 
Justice (1989)), a factor of ten smaller than the size of the boatlift. (It is worth noting, however, that INS 
statistics do not capture the boatlift – they report only 15,000 Cuban immigrants for 1980!)  
23 I have also limited the analysis to those Cubans aged 26-64 in 1990, i.e. those who could have been of 
working age when they arrived in the US. 
24 In this exercise there is no attempt to control for the counterfactual growth in the Cuban share of 
employment; it is merely done as a visual accounting exercise.       16
This is seen in Figure 7.  Each point in this figure represents by how much the Cuban share 
of employment grew in a particular industry after the boatlift  on the base of the  Cuban 
immigrants who arrived in Miami between 1975 and 1980.  This is plotted against the share 
of the 1975-80 Cuban cohort employed in that industry in 1980, a measure of that industry’s 
importance for Cuban employment before the boatlift.  If  the Mariel immigrants were 
employed in 1990 in exactly the same industries as the Cubans were before the boatlift, then 
all of the points would be on the horizontal line representing the growth in the Cuban share 
of the labor force. 
 
By 1990 it appears that almost all industries took on additional Cuban employment, with a 
majority of industries more than doubling their Cuban employment share, not surprising 
given that the Mariel boatlift appears to have tripled the Cuban workforce on this base.  In 
fact, these within-industry changes appear to be able to account for the vast majority of the 
supply increase.  So Miami appears to have absorbed the Mariel immigrants within industry. 
  
Computer Use 
After the boatlift the  Miami labor market  experienced an expansion of less-skilled 
employment without major cuts in less-skilled relative wages and  with little change in 
industry mix.  This pattern is similar to the rise in the relative employment of skilled workers 
during the 1980s – very little of which can be accounted for by changes in industry mix (e.g. 
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Bound and Johnson(1992)) – at the same time as their 
relative  wages went up.  Some researchers believe an exogenous demand shock for skill 
driven by the introduction of new skill-complementary technologies, such as computers, was       17
responsible for this (Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998)).  Acemoglu (2002) argued that the 
introduction of the new technology was not exogenous but the response of the market to a 
larger pool of skilled workers who would experience productivity benefits from such 
technology.  Beaudry and Green (2000, 2003) use data on multiple countries to argue that 
the degree to which the new technology was used was endogenous to the availability of skilled 
labor.  They show that skilled wages do not decline as skill supply increases. 
 
Miami may have adjusted to the boatlift in a manner similar to what is suggested by Beaudry 
and Green.  In this view, less-skilled wages did not fall in Miami after the boatlift because the 
influx of unskilled labor induced producers to adopt skill-complementary technologies at a 
slower rate.  To provide some suggestive evidence supporting this interpretation, I examine 
Miami’s use of the canonical skill-biased technology, computers.  Recent work suggests that 
computers may serve to replace unskilled labor (Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)). 
However, m easuring skill-biased technological change with computer use has caveats.  
DiNardo and Pishke (1997) revealed  the potential dubiousness  of Krueger’s (1993) 
interpretation of the correlation of computer use and wages as evidence of skill demand: 
skilled workers are more likely to be in occupations that use computers.
25  Similarly, if Miami 
has a low rate of computer use after the boatlift, it might simply reflect the lower tendency 
of unskilled Mariel immigrants individually to be at jobs that use a computer.  To account for 
this, I will attempt to regression adjust computer use  by Miami workers  for individual 
influences. 
 
                                                 
25 Krashinsky (2004) has also shown that controlling for a family fixed effect in a sample of twins makes the 
effect of computer use on wages go away.        18
The data come from the October 1984 Current Population Survey (CPS), which asked 
respondents “Do you use a computer directly at work?”  Table 4 estimates linear probability 
models comparing computer-use rates in Miami and comparison cities.  The comparison 
cities here include nine of the eleven metropolitan areas from the first set of comparison 
cities above (Richmond and Nashville are not observed in the 1984 CPS) plus the four cities 
used in the Card (1990) paper.  Having both sets of comparison cities is useful because they 
were chosen to match on prior trends in different outcome variables – the former set is 




Column (1) of Table 5 gives the baseline specification with no controls.  The intercept shows 
that 23 percent of workers used computers in Miami in 1984, several percentage points 
below each set of comparison cities (as indicated by the positive coefficient on the location 
dummies).
27  To insure that this lower rate of computer use in Miami was not simply the 
direct effect of Mariel immigrants themselves having low computer-use rates, in column (2) I 
drop all Cubans from the regression, which diminishes the computer-use gap.  The 
comparison may still not be valid: even among non-Cubans, Miami has more foreign-born 
residents than do  the comparison cities, and these residents may be less skilled than US 
natives in ways that are not completely measurable with the variables in the CPS (such as 
education, which is controlled for below).  Immigrant status is not observed in the CPS, so 
instead in column (3) I drop all Hispanics from the regression with the idea that Miami’s 
                                                 
26 In order to account for the fact that there is no individual-level variation in the location dummies, I cluster at 
this level in the regressions. 
27 The share of workers using a computer at work in the comparison cities in 1984: Chicago – 29%, Cincinnati 
– 24%, Cleveland – 23%, Greensboro – 23%, Minnesota – 32%, Nassau-Suffolk – 32%, Pittsburgh – 27%, 
Riverside – 23%, Rochester – 32%, Atlanta – 29%, Houston – 36%, Los Angeles – 28%, Tampa – 30%.       19
immigrants are mostly Hispanic (though not all Hispanics are immigrants).  This further 
reduces Miami’s computer-use gap with the first set of cities, but not with the Card (1990) 
cities, which include two major Hispanic-immigrant destinations (Houston and Los 
Angeles). 
 
Did the  observed  gap  in computer use  arise as a result of the boatlift or were there 
differences in computer use before the boatlift?  Unfortunately, there are no comparable 
estimates of computer use before the 1984 October CPS.  I proxy for pre-boatlift computer 
use with the share of workers in a respondent’s metropolitan area in 1980 employed in 
computer and peripheral technical support occupations (measured in the 1980 Census of 
Population).
28  This control is added in column (4).  Note that this is highly correlated with 
computer use in 1984, but its inclusion as a control has little effect on estimates of the gap in 
computer use, reflecting the fact that a similar share of the work force was employed in these 
occupations in Miami and the comparison cities in 1980.
29 
 
Even among non-Hispanics, Miami may differ in skill mix from the comparison cities.  To 
account for this, a very general function of age and education, fully interacted with gender, is 
controlled for in column (5) (see footnote in table for details).  These controls are highly 
significant (education has the most explanatory power) and their inclusion makes the gap 
with the first set of cities negative, and eliminates much, but not all, of the gap with the 
second set of cities.  Column (6) adds detailed occupation  controls (full set of 3 -digit 
                                                 
28 In other words, I use the metropolitan area level variation in this, rather than just at the treatment/control 
groups level variation.  This variable therefore takes on 14 different values (1+9+4).  
29 The fraction of workers were in these occupations in 1980 was 0.53 in Miami, 0.49 in the nine comparison 
cities, and 0.57 in the Card (1990) comparison cities.  The standard error on the difference between Miami and 
each set of comparison cities is 0.04 percent.       20
dummies), and interestingly the gap reasserts itself.  This says Miami has a higher share of its 
work force employed in the occupations that tend to use computers than the comparison 
cities, but once you control for that, the share of workers actually using a computer (i.e. the 
share of workers using a computer within a given occupation) is lower.  This suggests, 
consistent with the story being told, that Miami may have substituted manpower in certain 
jobs for what was being done elsewhere by computers.  The last column of the table adds 3-
digit industry controls, which has little impact on the gap: the difference in computer use is 
almost entirely  within industry,  also  important for  a story about induced technological 
change.  With the caveat that computer use is at best a proxy for other forms of factor-
biased technological change, these regressions are suggestive evidence that Miami adapted to 




This paper tries to explain the surprising fact that the Mariel boatlift had little impact on the 
labor market outcomes of Miami’s workers.  Since the Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts the 
insensitivity of relative wages to local factor supply shocks, this paper looks for evidence that 
the relative output of unskilled intensive manufacturing sectors went up in Miami after the 
boatlift and finds little evidence that it did.  Miami’s trends in manufacturing output mix 
after the boatlift were quite similar to other metropolitan areas that shared its trends before 
the boatlift.  There is, in particular, little evidence that apparel production rose significantly 
as a result of the boatlift, though some skilled manufacturing may have left Miami (along 
with workers who it might have employed). 
                                                 
30 Miami also has more blacks than either set of comparison cities, and blacks have lower computer use rates.  
After everything else in Table 4 is controlled for, however, neither a black dummy nor its interaction with other 
controls is significant, and its inclusion reduces the computer-use gap only slightly.       21
 
Finding convincing ways to evaluate trade theory is difficult, as conditions in the real world 
may deviate substantially from the theory, and few “experiments” exist.  Miami’s adjustment 
to the boatlift comes closer to the conditions needed to test the HO theory than do cross-
sectional studies between countries or between large states within a country, the approach 
taken by previous research evaluating HO.  The fact that there is little evidence to support 
HO in the present context suggests that at least in its simplest form, it may not be a very 
relevant theory (as Bowen et al. (1987) concluded). 
 
This paper points out that HO misses an important feature of the world: technology may 
not be the same in all locations, and f urthermore,  production  technology  may be 
systematically chosen to accommodate worker mix.
31  In this case, it appears abundant less-
skilled labor in Miami may have been accommodated by the use of less skill-intensive modes 
of production.  But this idea potentially also explains why wages and employment rates of 
natives are generally found to be insensitive to local immigration shocks (Borjas (1994), 
Friedberg and Hunt (1995)).  Though case study evidence always carries the caveat of 
potentially being of limited general value, other evidence indicates that a more representative 
set of US metropolitan areas adapted their production technology to changes in worker mix 
during the 1980s (Lewis (2003)).
32  The evidence here is only suggestive – computers appear 
to have been adopted more slowly in Miami after the boatlift than by similar workers in 
                                                 
31 Trefler (1993) reminded us that there may be factor specific productivity differences across locations.  He 
showed that once factors were adjusted for local productivity differences (converted to “effective” supplies) net 
exports from countries were predicted by factor supply mix as HO says it should be.  However, this does little 
to rescue HO as a true theory of trade because how these local productivity differences arise is uncertain. 
32 One reason why the case of the boatlift might be special is that the event fortuitously occurred near the 
beginning of the PC revolution.  Also, forgoing new technologies may be an easier adjustment to make than 
implementing them more rapidly.       22
other markets – but fits with this view.  Future research might therefore incorporate the 
choice of technology into models of trade.       23
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 Differ-  
ence
Labor Force/Capita
  Cubans 0.13 -0.04 0.17
*
  High School Dropouts 0.08 -0.28 0.36
*
  High School Graduates -0.26 -0.19 -0.07
*
  Some College 0.30 0.50 -0.21
*
  College Graduates 0.13 0.30 -0.17
*
Employment Rates
  Black 0.00 0.06 -0.06
*
  Non-Cuban Hispanic 0.03 0.09 -0.06
*
All…
  High School Dropouts -0.01 0.02 -0.03
*
  High School Graduates 0.01 0.03 -0.02
*
  Some College 0.03 0.03 0.00
  College Graduates 0.02 0.02 0.00
Black…
    High School Dropouts -0.03 0.01 -0.04
*
    High School Graduates 0.00 0.02 -0.02
Non-Cuban Hispanic…
    High School Dropouts 0.03 0.08 -0.05
*
    High School Graduates 0.01 0.03 -0.03
Hourly Wages (CPI-deflated)
  Black -0.10 -0.07 -0.03
  Non-Cuban Hispanic -0.13 0.07 -0.20
  High School Dropouts -0.12 -0.12 0.00
Black…
    High School Dropouts -0.17 -0.24 0.08
Non-Cuban Hispanic…
    High School Dropouts -0.21 -0.13 -0.09
1980-1990 Growth in Labor Force Attributes, Miami 
and Comaprison Region
Table 1
Source: 1980, 1990 5% PUMS. 
*Significanlty different 
from 0 at the 5% level.All  Miami All  Miami
Education Shares
<9th Grade 0.353 0.378 0.391 0.405
<12th Grade 0.541 0.576 0.631 0.642
12th Grade 0.217 0.199 0.169 0.158
Some College 0.118 0.115 0.133 0.130
College+ 0.124 0.110 0.067 0.071
Employment Shares
Manufacturing 0.286 0.290 0.208 0.199
Apparel 0.061 0.068 0.037 0.047
Group 1 0.073 0.078 0.068 0.059
Group 2 0.072 0.068 0.043 0.041
Group 3 0.080 0.076 0.060 0.052
N 1,243 790 4,814 2,692
Share in Miami…. 0.636 0.559
Table 2
The Education and Manufacturing Industries of Pre-





Source: 1980, 1990 5% PUMS.  "Mariel" Immigrants defined 
as Cuban immigrants arriving in 1980-81 who were aged 16-
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.60 0.65 1.05 0.83 1.00 0.86 1.02 0.94
(0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Miami -0.08 -0.07 0.05 -0.05 -0.11 -0.21 0.02 -0.05
(0.15) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
Trend -0.09 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trend*Miami -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Post 1980 0.07 -0.32 -0.21 -0.11
(0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08)
Post 1980 0.01 -0.14 -0.15 -0.10
 * Miami (0.18) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11)
Post 1980*Trend 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Post 1980*Trend  0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.02
 * Miami (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R
2 0.847 0.845 0.601 0.324 0.690 0.536 0.830 0.796
Table 3
Linear Trends In Output Per Capita (1972-79=1.00) in Miami and Comparison 
Cities, by Industry Group
Apparel Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Source: US Census Bureau, CES, Annual Survey of Manufacturers data.  Time is measured as years after 
1980 (e.g., 1979 = -1).  Annual data from 1972-1996, 1980 data point excluded.Coeffcient Apparel Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Intercept -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Pre-1980 -1.03 -1.08 -1.28 -1.04
  Trend Diff (0.07) (0.09) (0.18) (0.11)
R
2 0.67 0.59 0.33 0.45
N Cities 108 108 108 108
Regression of Post-1980 Trend Break on Pre-1980 Trend 
Difference
Table 4
Source: US Census Bureau, CES, Annual Survey of Manufacturers.  
Regressions of pre-1980 trend difference on post-1980 trend break.  
Each comparison city weighted by 1980 population.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
In Comparison City
† 0.047 0.023 0.003 0.010 -0.013 0.010 0.009
(0.023) (0.028) (0.031) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007)
In Card (1990) Comp- 0.075 0.052 0.058 0.051 0.022 0.042 0.041
  arison City
‡ (0.024) (0.028) (0.032) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Pre-Mariel (1980) Share 19.079 11.715 7.832 8.954
  Computer Ops, this MA (5.743) (4.836) (3.552) (3.706)
Constant 0.231 0.256 0.282 0.181 -2.295 -0.939 -0.515
(0.022) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.224) (0.301) (0.260)
Cubans Excluded? NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other Hispanics Excluded? NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Ed, Age, Gender Controls?
§
NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Occupation Dummies? NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Industry Dummies? NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
R
2 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.107 0.330 0.379
N 8,592 8,451 7,634 7,634 7,634 7,634 7,634
Explaining 1984 Computer Use in Miami and Comparison Cities
Table 5
Source: 1984 October CPS and 1980 Census of Population (PUMS).  Standard errors in columns (4) - (7) take account error correlation among observations in the 
same city group (Miami and each of the two comparison groups).  
†Cincinnati, Cleveland, Minneapolis, Rochester, Pittsburgh, Greensboro, Nassau-Suffolk, 
Riverside, Chicago. 
‡Atlanta, Houston, Tampa, Los Angeles. 
§Fully interacted by gender: dummies for 1-18 years of education, quartic in age, and an interaction of 
years of education and quadratic in age.  Results are robust to other specifications.Figure 1









































Source: US Census Bureau, CES, 
Annual Survey of Manufactures.
1972-79=1.00Figure 2















































Source: US Census Bureau, CES, 
Annual Survey of Manufactures.Figure 3
















































Source: US Census Bureau, CES, 
Annual Survey of Manufactures.Figure 4















































Source: US Census Bureau, CES, 
Annual Survey of Manufactures.Figure 5
Post-1980 Change in Trend on Pre-1980 Trend in Output per Capita, in 
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y=-0.01 - 1.03x, R
2 = 0.67
  (0.01) (0.07)
Source: US Census Bureau, CES, Annual 
Survey of Manufactures.  Line shown is 
fitted least squares line through the 
points.  (Estimate weighted by 1980 
population).Source: US Census Bureau, Annual Survey of Manufactures
Figure 6
Post-1980 Change in Trend on Pre-1980 Trend in Output per 
Capita, Miami Relative to Each Metro Area
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Impact of Mariel Boatlift on Growth of Cuban Share of Employment, by Industry, Miami
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Impact on Growth of Cuban Share of LF
Source: 1980, 1990 
PUMS.  See text 
for details.Apparel Group 2 Group 2
Apparel/Accessories, Ex Knit 0.061 (continued) (continued)
Petroleum Refining Watches/Clocks/Clock Op Dvcs
Group 1 -- Positive Response to Dropouts Dairy Products 0.004 Wood Buildings/Mobile Homes
Meat Products 0.002 Pottery & Related Products Construction/Mat Handl Mach
Bakery Products 0.005 Railrd Locomotives/Equipment Agricultural Chemicals 0.001
Misc. Food Preparation Office & Accounting Machines Dye/Fnsh Text, Ex Wool, Knit
Knitting Mills 0.004 Grain Mill Products 0.004
Yarn, Thread, Fabric Mills 0.010 Canned/Preserved Fruits/Veg 0.001 Group 3 -- Negative Response to Dropouts
Misc. Fabricated Textile 0.005 OthRubber/Plastics Ftwr/Belt 0.001 Farm Machinery & Equipment 0.004
Industrial/Misc. Chemicals 0.001 Tires & Inner Tubes Drugs 0.002
Footwear, Ex Rubber & Plastic 0.012 Misc. Petroleum/Coal Pdts. Pulp, Paper & Paperbd Mills
Blast Furnaces/Steelwrks/roll & fin 0.004 Household Appliances 0.001 Metal Forgings, Stampings
Engines & Turbines 0.001 Ship/Boat Building/Repairing 0.006 Soaps & Cosmetics 0.002
Metalworking Machinery 0.001 Cmnt/Concrete/Gypsum/Plaster Screw Machine Products 0.001
Machinery, Except Electrical 0.005 Sugar and Confect Pdts 0.007 Primary Aluminum 0.002
Electr Machinery, Eq & Supplies 0.010 Other Primary Metal 0.006 Fabiricated Structural Metal 0.006
Guided Missles/Spce Vh/Parts Floor Cover, Ex Hard Surface 0.001 Pub/Print Except Newspaper 0.014
Scientific & Controlling Insts Leather Pdts, Ex Footwear 0.005 Logging
Cycles & Misc. Trsport Equip Paints/Varnishes 0.001 Newspaper Pub/Print 0.005
Health Services Supplies 0.002 Misc. Paper & Pulp Products 0.004 Sawmills/Planing/Millwork 0.004
Photographic Equip/Supplies 0.001 Misc. Plastics Products 0.005 Furniture & Fixtures 0.011
Misc. Manuf 0.009 Ordnance 0.001 Radio/TV/Communication Eq 0.004
Leather Tanning & Finishing Motor Vehicles/Equip 0.006
Group2 -- Little Response to Dropouts Beverage Industries 0.005 Cutlery/Handtls/Oth Hrdwr
Misc Wood Products 0.002 Iron & Steel Foundries Misc. Fabricated Metal 0.001
Glass & Glass Pdts. 0.005 Structural Clay Products 0.001 Tobacco Manufacturers 0.002
Misc. Nonmet Mineral/Stone 0.004 Plastics/Synthetics/Resins 0.005 Toys/Amusement/Sprting Gds 0.006
Paperboard Containers, Boxes 0.001 Misc textile Mill Products 0.001 Electr Computing Equipment 0.001
Aircraft & Parts 0.006
Source: 1980 PUMS.  Blank cells have no pre-Mariel Cuban employment in the 1980 Census.
and 1980 Share of Pre-Mariel (1975-80 arrival cohort) Cuban Employment in Each Industry
Appendix Table: Census of Population Industies in Each Industry Group